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stones back, "each a little bigger than the size of a penny" and the
small stones fell harmlessly. The Board further stated:
In our opinion, Ottino's conduct, under the circumstances here-
inabove set forth ... was not of such a serious nature as to pass the
limits of protected activity.
As can be seen by the cited authorities, the question of what
constitutes misconduct is somewhat vague and is still in the stage
of development. However, as a general guide, it is suggested that
the definition cited by the trial examiner in the Tidewater Asso-
ciated Oil Company case, citing Boynton Cab Co. vs. Neubeck, by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 27 may be used. This reads as
follows:
* * * The term "Misconduct" used in (the disqualification provision)
is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an
employer's interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard
of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of
his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or re-
currence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil
design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the
employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to his
employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory con-
duct, failure in good performance as a result of inability or incapacity,
inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances or good
faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed "miscon-
duct" within the meaning of the statute.
PICKETING- FREE SPEECH?
CHARLES A. GRAHAM
of the Denver Bar
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Thornhill v. Alabama1 has given rise to extensive speculation as
to the legal status of picketing.
2
Language employed by the court has been quoted to support
the contention that picketing is a form of speech on a parity with
public debate for purposes of determining its constitutional im-
munity to regulation.3 The consequences, of course, would be that
picketing could be neither forbidden nor punished unless upon a
showing of a clear and present danger of extremely serious4 sub-
27296 N. W. 636 (1941).
310 U.S. 88 (1949).
'Adequate citation to the legal journals alone would require more than the space
allocated for this discussion. A few references will be provided below.
3 One of the most specific statements of this sort, made by the late Mr. Justice
Murphy, was: "In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free
discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution." (Supra, n. 1 at 102).
4 "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working prin-
ciple that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before utterances can be punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 263 (1941).
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stantive evils arising "under circumstances affording no oppor-
tunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion." 5
Subsequent dissenting opinions suggest that this free speech
theory of picketing did no injustice to those from whose opinions
the quotations were drawn.0 It was nonetheless subjected to dras-
tic curtailment in a series of decisions. 7 The culminating and pres-
ent position of the frequently divided Court," as formulated in
Hughes v. Superior Court,9 is that: "Picketing is not beyond the
control of a State if the manner' in which picketing is conducted
or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its dis-
allowance.""'
ALLOWABLE AREA OF ECONOMIC CONFLICT
As to the manner of conduct, picketing must be peaceful;"
though the occasional use of strong or insulting language and
"isolated incidents of abuse ' 12 or a "trivial rough incident or a
moment of animal exuberance" 13 does not suffice to remove its
constitutional protection. Picketing may be conducted by strangers
to the dispute without loss of its constitutional status14 and this is
so though the picketed employer may have no employees at all.' 5
Constitutional protection may be forfeited by pickets who seek
to conscript neutrals remote both in interest and in location from
5 Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, at 105. See Free Speech and Picketing for "Unlawful
Objectives", 16 Univ. Chi. L. REv. 701 (Note - 1949).
6 See, for example, the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black (Justices Douglas
and Murphy concurring) and Mr. Justices Reed in Carpenters and Joiners Union v.
Ritters Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Minton (joined
by Justice Reed) in International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 482 (1950) : "It
seems equally clear to me that peaceful picketing which is used properly as an instru-
ment of publicity has been held by this court in . . . (citing cases) to be protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment."
See Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally Protected?, 99 Univ. Pa. L.
Rev. I (1950) ; Armstrong, Where Are We Going with Picketing7, 36 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (1948) ; Picketing, Free Speech and the Unlaw Purpose Tests, 49 COL. L. REV. 711
(Note, 1949).
8 In the most controversial cases Mr. Justice Frankfurter commonly writes the
majority opinion of the "now" Court; Justices Vinson, Jackson, Burton and Clark con-
cur; Justices Black, Douglas, Reed and Minton dissent. Devotees of the broad theory
of "breakfast jurisprudence" may well speculate as to the impact on the sanctity of
picketing of certain recent changes in the personnel of the Court.
' 339 U.S. 460 (1950). As to the lower court decision, see Groves, Right of Negroes
to Picket for Proportional Hiring, 22 So. CAL. L. REV. 442 (Comment 1949) ; (Note) 62
HARv. L. REV. 1077 (1949).
i0 This is also the position generally taken by state courts even during the period
of seeming uncertainty in the decision of the United States Supreme Court. See Free
Speech and Picketing for "Unlawful Objectives," supra, n. 5; James v. Marinship Corp.,
25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944) ; Colonial Press v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E.
2d 1 (1947) ; Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance v. Greenwood,
Ala ...... 30 So. 2d 696 (1947) ; Schwab v. Moving Picture Machine Operators Local
No. 159, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P. 2d 600 (1941) ; Wolferman, Inc. v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204
S.W. 2d 733 (1947) ; Swenson v. Seattle Central Trades Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 177
P. 2d 873 (1947) ; International Association of Machinists v. Downtown Employees
Association, Texas, Court of Civil Appeals, First District at Galveston. 13 Labor Cases,
Paragraph 64,053, 7/31/47.
" If it is "enmeshed in violence," all picketing, for the time being, may be forbidden.
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmore Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
n2 Use of epithets such as "Unfair" or "Fascist" is protected, Cafeteria Employees
Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
1" Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmore Dairies, Inc., supra, n. 11..
" American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
"Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 (1943). (former employees
having become partners; a technique not unknown even in Colorado).
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the controversy'" or who follow employees from the job and picket
them in their homes. 1'7 It may not be declared forfeit, however,
simply because there is no labor dispute as defined in a state regu-
lation of industrial relations i8 or because picketing discourages
customers or reduces services of the employer. 19
Picketing also may lose its constitutional immunity to injunc-
tive relief if the purpose it seeks to effectuate is to compel a viola-
tion of state anti-trust laws, 20 a state labor relations act,2' or the
National Labor Relations Act.22 The illegality of the purpose may
likewise derive from judicial as compared with legislative policy.
2 '
Thus picketing "has an ingredient of communication ''2 4 that
may not be forbidden or punished except in conformity with the
strict limitations of the clear and present danger rule. Yet picketing
"cannot dogmatically be equated with the constitutionally protect-
ed freedom of speech"; it may be forbidden or punished provided
in conduct or objective it is found unlawful by legislative or ju-
dicial test not inconsistent with the "rooted traditions of a free
people." Picketing, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter so clearly stated
in the Hanke case, is "indeed a hybrid."
2
5
STATE DECISIONS NOT VERY HELPFUL
The Colorado decisions during the period under discussion
require brief comment. In Denver Local Union v. Perry Truck
Lines26 and Denver Local Union v. Buckingham Transportation
Co.2 7 the Colorado Supreme Court applied the rule that peaceful,
stranger picketing is entirely lawful. In Milk Producers v. Broth-
erhood2 8 the Court seems 29 to have sustained a restraining order
based upon unlawful manner of conduct and not precluded by the
Colorado Labor Peace Act.30 In Meat Cutters v. Greens , it would
appear that similar freedom from the inhibtions of that Act 32 en-
abled a restraint based upon illegality of objective.
3 3
" Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritters' Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
"TAllen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U.S. 740 (1942).
's Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942). See Teller, Picketing and
Free Speech, 56 1ARV. L. REV. 180, 193 (1942).
19 Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
20 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) ; (Note) 10 LA. L.
REV. 541 (1950); (Note) 62 -ARv. L. REV. 1402 (1949); Free Speech and Picketing
for "Unlawful Objectives", supra, n. 5.
2 Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Wilbank v. Bar-
tenders Union, 360 Pa. 48, 60 A. 2d 21 (1948) ; cert. den. 336 U.S. 945 (1949).
22 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor Relations
Board, CCA-2, 1950) 181 F. 2d 34. See (Note) 45 ILL. L. REV. 408, 409 (1950).
21 Hughes v. Superior Court, supra, n. 9; International Brotherhood v. Hanke, 339
U.S. 470 (1950). See (Note) 3 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1950).
uInternational Brotherhood v. Hanke, supra, n. 23.
25 Idem, supra, n. 23. As W. S. Gilbert has so clearly stated : "Of this there is no
manner of doubt, no probable possible shadow of doubt, no possible doubt whatever"
(Gilbert and Sullivan, Gondoliers, Act I).
2 106 Colo. 25, 101 P. 2d 436 (1940).
27108 Colo. 419, 118 P. 2d 1088 (1941).
116 Colo. 389, 183 P. 2d 529 (1947).
-" 'Because of the inadequacy of the record we decline to decide the constitutional
issues involved." 334 U.S. 809 (1948 per curiam).
'COLO. STAT. ANN., (1935), c. 97, § 94.
31 119 Colo. 92, 200 P. 924 (1948).
Idem, supra, n. 30.
"2 The union seemingly demanded an agreement unlawfully forcing union member-
ship upon employees as in Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, supra, n. 21.
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Brotherhood v. Publix Cab Co., presents a set of kaleidoscopic
facets that, it is to be hoped, will not soon recur.', After a caution
as to limited applicability of its decision to other situations, 36 the
court concluded with reference to only a few of the conflicts and
ambiguities as follows: 1
Where, as in this case, the record shows the absence of any
negotiations having taken place, or a dispute having occurred, or a
statement of grievances having been submitted by the individuals
striking and picketing to the individuals against whom the strike has
been called and against whom the pickets are presumably picketing,
we say that it is against the public interest to allow such picketing
because a bona fide dispute has not been shown to exist.
The quest for certainty in this field is rewarding in neither
state nor national jurisdiction. Could it be that the legal problem
has a political aspect and thus will be solved more easily after a
few more Supreme Court vacancies are filled, or, perhaps, after
November 4, 1952?
AGUIDETO THE TRIAL OF AN EMPLOYEE SUIT
UNDER THE WAGE AND HOUR LAW
EDWARD H. SHERMAN
of the Denver Bar
This article has been prepared primarily to aid the general
practitioner who is called upon either to sue or defend a claim
arising out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The busy practi-
tioner faced with an employee suit for these claims is bewildered
by the maze of statutory, judicial, and administrative rulings. He
has not had many occasions to delve into a new field of law which
in a short time has developed into a complexity of rules and de-
cisions which compare to that developed in other fields in over
a hundred years. This article does not presume to be a treatise
on the law. It does not claim to be exhaustive. It will deal with
substantive law only incidentally. The object is to point out cer-
tain common problems of procedure and practice which you will
probably face when you sue for an employee or defend his em-
ployer.
Let us assume that you represent the employee. He seeks to
recover minimum wages or overtime pay which his employer
21 119 Colo. 208,, 202 P. 2d 154 (194i).
s Two attempts at strike votes were "unsuccessful"; union collective bargaining
authorizations and revocations circulated like counterfeit bills; an unheralded strike
was called; the union officials said the strike was against the owner-drivers, but all
the strikers except one said it was against Publix Cab Co. ; no attempt had been made by
the union to negotiate with the owner-drivers against whom the officials said the strike
was called and whom the union at the same time purported to represent. Controversy
raged as to who represented whom, who was employed by whom and for what purpose,
and which statute if any was applicable.
so In which the writer respectfully joins.
S' Supra, n. 34 at 217.
